This paper tests for contagion during the episode of financial turmoil surrounding the Asian crisis and advocates the use of synchronous instead of synchronized data to correctly measure stock market comovements. Our analysis reveals that synchronized data lead to an over-identification of contagion for the early Thailand crisis phase but an under-identification of contagion during the late Hong Kong crisis phase. When using synchronous data, we find little evidence of contagion from Thailand but strong evidence of contagion from Hong Kong to other markets. Overall, our findings should caution researchers and practitioners alike when drawing conclusions based on synchronized data.
Introduction
During the last decades, financial markets have experienced a number of crises starting with the Latin American debt crisis in the mid 1980s, the US stock market crash in 1987, the EMS crisis in 1992, the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, and most recently the Asian and Russian crises in 1997-98. To date, it is common believe that the most recent (Asian) financial crisis, that begun with the devaluation of the Thai bath in July 1997, is more widespread than previous crises, and hence is exerting a greater effect on industrial countries. Moreover, the perception has arisen that the crisis has been more virulent in its impact on the affected economies. It appears to be the first genuinely global financial crisis to hit the emerging market economies, affecting, as it has, Asia, Russia, South Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, it appears to be more deeply rooted in financial imbalances in the private sector than in the public sector financial problems that characterized the 1980s debt crisis or the Mexican crisis. This suggests the fundamental questions regarding the causes and transmission channels of financial crises as raised by Kamin (1999) , namely, "Have these crises grown increasingly severe in their impact on affected countries, or are we merely more aware of their impact and consequences than was the case in the past?". If crises are indeed transmitted to interdependent countries through real and stable linkages such as export-import relations, then the spread of a crisis can be limited and countries with good economic fundamentals should be protected.
On the other hand, if crises are contagious in the sense that speculative attacks, financial panic, or herd behavior are the transmission forces, then crises would spread further and national policy makers face difficulties in protecting their market from such a crisis. As is well documented for many episodes of financial turmoil, empirical analyses of crises demonstrated several contradictions with respect to their origin, transmission mechanisms, and causes. Moreover, the paradoxes revealed in the data have in turn influenced both the development of new theoretical (transmission) models and the debate on reforming the international financial architecture. Overall, early empirical evidence favors the existence of contagion for a number of countries: this, for instance was the experience of the recent crises that originated in Mexico and South-East Asia in the 1990s.
1 More recently, however, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) support interdependence over contagion when they note that correlation coefficients for multi-country returns are not significantly higher during crisis periods if the problem of changes in the variance of residuals (heteroskedasticity) is properly corrected for. Thus, the large cross-market linkages after a shock are simply a continuation of strong transmission mechanisms that exist in more stable periods. In a follow-up paper, Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002) demonstrate that this strong result of 'no contagion, only interdependence' can be attributed to arbitrary assumptions on the variance of the market-specific noise in the country where the crisis originated -assumptions that bias the test towards the null hypothesis of interdependence. Overall, the findings overwhelmingly favor the conclusion that the discussion on the issue of 'no contagion, only interdependence' remains open and unsettled.
We argue that in addition to the problem of heteroskedasticity, all previous findings based on cross-market correlation coefficients suffer from another major drawback; the use of close-to-close returns misestimate returns correlation because international stock markets have different trading hours. Here we draw on Martens and Poon (2001) who find dynamics of daily correlation and covariance, estimated using two non-synchroneity adjustment procedures, to be substantially different from their synchronous counterparts.
Hence, correlation analyses based on closing prices are usually underestimating the true return correlation between stock markets in stable periods but, as our results show, the direction of the misestimation cannot be as easily generalized for crises periods.
Recently, only efforts have been made in correcting daily correlation for bias due to data non-synchroneity for matters of testing volatility spillovers from the US to the UK and
France. To the best of our knowledge, this non-synchroneity procedure is never applied to the important issue of 'no contagion, only interdependence' in cases where stock exchanges do not share common trading hours.
In particular, when applying our test to the international implications of the Asian crisis of July 1997 we calculate conditional and unconditional correlation coefficients based on synchronous as well as synchronized data for 15 countries during the episode of financial turmoil surrounding the Asian crisis, and are thus able to illustrate both the consequences of the estimation problems observed in previous studies. Our results are easily summarized. Whereas the adjustment suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) had the clear directional implication that the use of conditional correlations leads to an overidentification of contagion, the consequences of using synchronous data regarding the over-or under-identification of contagion are not predictable. Looking at two different phases of the Asian crisis, reveals an over-identification of contagion for the early Thailand crisis phase but an under-identification of contagion during the late Hong Kong crisis phase when using synchronized data. Correspondingly when using synchronous data, which provide an accurate timing of the returns, we find weak evidence of a significant change in the transmission mechanisms from Thailand to any of the other country in our sample revealing that most financial shocks are thus transmitted through non-crisis-contingent channels. Contrary to our Thailand finding and the strong results of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , we find evidence of contagion from the Hong Kong stock market to a majority of the stock markets in our sample.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discuss the theoretical background and main empirical findings of how financial shocks are transmitted internationally in the light of our analysis of contagion versus interdependence. Section 3 introduces our set-up and derives an alternative way of measuring contagion. Section 4 outlines the construction of the synchronized and synchronous data and provides descriptive statistics. In Section 5, we address the principal question of 'contagion versus interdependence' and discuss the correlation dynamics and results from estimating synchronous unconditional correlation coefficients.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
I. Measuring contagion

A. Crisis theories
According to the group of crisis-contingent theories, a number of very different channels through which shocks could be transmitted internationally can be observed: multiple equilibria based on investors psychology, endogenous-liquidity shocks causing a portfolio recomposition and political economy affecting exchange rate regimes. Each of these theories could explain the existence of shift-contagion defined as a significant increase in cross-market linkage after a shock to an individual country (or group of countries). This definition implies that if two markets are highly correlated after a shock, this is not necessarily contagion. Moreover, this definition concurs with our intuitive understanding of contagion and is useful in evaluating the effectiveness of international diversification and differentiating between various propagation mechanisms.
The first mechanism, multiple equilibria, occurs when a crisis in one country is used as a sunspot for other countries and results solely from the behavior of investors or other financial agents. The shift from a good to bad equilibrium, and the transmission of the initial shock (i.e. shift-contagion), is driven by a change in investors' expectations or beliefs and not by any real linkages; the shock is transmitted through a propagation mechanism that does not exist during stable periods. This type of contagion is often caused by "irrational" phenomena, such as financial panic, herd behavior, or a loss in confidence and can explain why speculative attacks occur in economies that appear to be fundamentally sound. In the second model of endogenous liquidity, the liquidity shock leads to an increased correlation in asset prices. This transmission mechanism does not occur during stable periods but arises only after the initial shock. Finally, according to the political transmission mechanism, exchanges rate crisis may be bunched together driven by the reduced political costs of abandoning the countries' fixed exchange rates and the resulting increased likelihood of these countries to switch exchange rate regimes; once again, transmission of the initial shock occurs through a mechanism that did not exist before the initial crisis. Although different approaches and models are used to develop these theories, they all share one critical implication: the transmission mechanism during the crisis is inherently different from that before the shock.
In contrast, the remainder of the transmission theories do not generate shiftcontagion. These non-crisis-contingent theories assume that cross-market linkages do not increase after a shock; any large cross-market correlations after a shock are a continuation of (real) linkages that existed before the crisis. Examples of so-called "real linkages" transmission mechanism are trade, policy coordination, country re-evaluation, and random aggregate shocks.
In general, any test based on the concept of shift-contagion avoids taking a stance on how this shift occurs and avoids having to directly measure and differentiate between the various propagation mechanisms, such as real linkages and financial linkages.
However, identifying whether shifts in cross-market linkages exist could provide evidence for or against specific theories of transmission and may indicate which propagation mechanisms are most important.
B. Empirical evidence
In addition to the theoretical literature, there is extensive empirical evidence on testing for contagion and the transmission mechanism of shocks. Four major categories of tests have been utilized for evidence of contagion during a number of financial and currency crises: correlation of asset prices, GARCH frameworks (volatility spillovers), cointegration, and probit models.
Overall, the findings overwhelmingly favor the conclusion that contagion -no matter how it is defined or measured -occurred during the crisis under investigation. As a result, most shocks are transmitted through crisis-contingent channels, such as those based on multiple equilibria, endogenous liquidity, or political economy. For instance, King and Wadhwani (1990) test for an increase in cross-market correlations between the U.S., U.K. and Japan and find that correlations increase significantly after the U.S. stock market crash. Lee and Kim (1993) extend this analysis to twelve major markets and find further evidence of contagion. Calvo and Reinhart (1995) and Baig and Goldfajn (1999) present evidence for contagion after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the 1997 Asian 8 crisis; cross-market correlations usually increased significantly during the crises period for many of the countries. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) estimate probit models to test how a crisis in one country (the exogenous event) affects the probability of a crisis occurring in other countries. The latter study finds that this probability increases when more crises are occurring in other countries (especially in the same region), whereas the former finds that the probability of a country suffering a speculative attack increases when another (ERM) country is under attack.
This study examines whether there exists shift-contagion and focuses only on the first approach: asset-price tests based on estimates of changes in correlation coefficients for stock prices of different economies. Under this approach, a significant increase in correlations among different countries' markets is considered evidence of shift-contagion. Table I provides an overview of previous empirical studies based on the correlation of asset prices methodology. Despite the variety of countries and time periods investigated, all but one of these studies share one critical implication: the transmission mechanism during (or directly after) the crisis under investigation is inherently different from that before the shock and therefore shift-contagion occurred during the international transmission of financial shocks.
[insert Table I about here] Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , however, demonstrated that the presence of heteroskedasticity in market returns could have a significant impact on estimates of crossmarket correlations. Therefore, when market volatility increases, which tend to happen during crises, any test will overstate the magnitude of cross-market relationships and may suggest that contagion occurred, even when the underlying propagation mechanism is constant and shift-contagion does not occur. By using daily data for stock indices of 28 developed and emerging countries to test for evidence of contagion during the 1987 U.S.
stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and the 1997 Asian crisis, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that correlation coefficients for multi-country returns are not significantly higher during crisis periods if the problem of changes in the variance of residuals are properly corrected. The large cross-market linkages after a shock are simply a continuation of strong transmission mechanisms that exist in more stable periods. On the contrary, Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002) demonstrate that this strong result of 'no contagion, only interdependence' can be attributed to arbitrary assumptions on the variance of the market-specific noise in the country where the crisis originatedassumptions that bias the test towards the null hypothesis of interdependence. For plausible values of the of the variance of country-specific shocks in Hong Kong, they find evidence of contagion to the stock markets in Singapore, the Philippines, France, Italy, and the UK. These results are in contrast with the strong findings of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , and suggest a further discussion on 'contagion versus interdependence'.
II. An alternative way of measuring contagion
In the empirical analysis of this study we focus on the correlation-based measures of contagion when proposing an alternative way of measuring contagion. As outlined in the previous section, early studies of contagion applied simple unadjusted crossmarket correlation coefficients, so-called conditional correlation coefficients. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2002) , however, correctly realized that these conditional correlation coefficients overestimate the actual cross-market relationship in particular in periods of high volatility. To remedy this overestimation problem, unconditional correlation coefficients have been applied instead. In this paper we argue that there still exists another misestimation problem. Both conditional as well as unconditional correlation coefficients underestimate the actual cross-market relationship if -as it is the case with all current studies of contagion -these coefficients are based on synchronized data. To remedy this misestimation problem we advocate the use of synchronous data. As our results will show, synchronous correlation coefficients are clearly different than synchronized correlation coefficients in periods of low volatility (stable periods) as well as in periods of high volatility (crisis periods). Whereas in periods of low volatility synchronous correlation coefficients tend to be higher, the direction of the misestimation when using synchronized correlation is less clear in periods of high volatility. Thus, only when applying synchronous unconditional correlation coefficients can one draw correct conclusions about contagion or interdependency.
More specifically, we calculate conditional and unconditional correlation coefficients based on synchronous as well as synchronized data for 15 countries in the period surrounding the Asian crisis and are thus able to illustrate both the consequences of the misestimation problem in this case. Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002) , we model a linear relationship between stock market returns in two countries x and y as
where x denotes the ground-zero country in which the crisis originates -Thailand in our case -and y denotes the country into which the crisis might -or might not -have spilled over 2 . In a first step, the conditional correlation coefficient ρ C between the returns of two markets is calculated as
Note that the overestimation problem is driven by the fact that ρ C will increase when the variance of r x increases -even if the actual correlation between r x and r y does not change. For periods of high volatility, such as crisis periods, this implies first, that ρ C will increase as volatility increases and second, that ρ C will overestimate the actual correlation. To avoid this overestimation problem, an unconditional correlation
where δ reflects the relative increase in the variance of ground-zero country's return r x measured for two time periods, the high-volatility crisis period (h) and low-volatility stable period (l) as defined below:
Testing for contagion centers on the null-hypothesis of interdependencies, which compares the correlation coefficient in the stable, low-volatility period ρ l with the correlation coefficient in the high-volatility crisis period ρ h .
Note that when testing conditional correlations coefficients, ρ l is measured by ρ assume that both correlation coefficients are based on return-samples drawn from independent bivariate normal distributions with the same correlation coefficient. Thus, we can perform a Fisher z-transformation, which is in general defined as
Now the difference between z(ρ l ) and z(ρ h ) can be shown to be normally distributed such
where ρ h is the estimated correlation coefficient during a crisis, ρ l is (3) evaluated using the estimated correlation coefficient in the low-volatility stable period, n l and n h indicate that number of observations in the high-and low-volatility period, respectively. Overall, we can reject the null-hypothesis of interdependence if the calculated value for [z(ρ h )-
] is larger than the critical value.
Whereas the use of unconditional correlation coefficient addresses the overestimation problem, it does not address the misestimation problem, which results from the use of synchronized data. Studies such as those listed in Table I draw their conclusions regarding contagion on correlation coefficient calculated from closing prices.
Given the geographic location of the countries under investigation, the market's trading hours and thus timing of these closing prices can deviate from each other by several hours. The resulting stock prices and market indices can be expected, i.e. during a crisis period, to reflect quite different sets of information. The existing studies try to circumvent this problem of non-synchronicity by using 2-day returns. However, we believe that whereas multiple-day returns might circumvent to problem of different trading hours, non-synchronous returns still lead to a problem of misestimation of correlations. We base this belief on Martens and Poon (2001) who show that synchronized close-to-close returns have substantially different correlation and covariance dynamics than synchronous returns. This could for example be due to the effects of new information is arriving at a point in time after the closing of one market but before the closing of another market. In such cases, studies based on synchronized data cannot distinguish between spillovers and contemporaneous correlation. In the analysis of contagion, however, the correct estimation of correlation is of utmost importance in order to draw reliable conclusions about contagion and interdependencies. If for example non-synchronous returns underestimate (overestimate) the true correlation when cross-market correlation is positive, the conditional and unconditional correlations reported so far in previous studies were too low (high) and could have potentially lead to incorrect conclusions about crisis contagion. In this study, we set out to illustrate and remedy this misestimation problem for the case of the Asian crisis.
III. Data
To illustrate the benefits of using synchronous data, we apply the methodology outlined above to different phases of the Asian crisis of 1997. It is widely agreed, that the start of this crisis is defined by Thailand's decision to float their currency on July 2, 1997.
Consequently, Thailand constitutes our ground-zero country x from which the crisis potentially spilled over into other countries. Regarding the definition of a low-volatility stable period l versus a high-volatility crisis period h, we recognize the fact that the Asian crisis was followed quickly by the Russian crisis in 1998. Thus, we define the lowvolatility period as a pre-crisis period, which ranges from January 1, 1996 until the day before the start of the crisis period. In particular, we consider two different sub-periods of the Asian crisis. Whereas the Asian crisis started in the currency markets at the beginning of July 1997, its effects were not felt in the stock markets until the end of the month. Having increased sharply in the last week of June, the Thai market index was ranging between 600 and 700 during the month of July revealing an overall positive trend. The market reached its peak on July 29 with a closing index of 679.2. However, during the period July, 30 until September 2, the market lost nearly 28% of its value. Thus, we considered a first crisis sub-period to range from July 30 to September 2. In addition, we consider a second crisis sub-period from October 17 to November 16. Here we follow Figure 1 . Thus, such a large time difference in returns is clearly important during a crisis period when market changes are fast and large.
Furthermore, Figures 1 to 4 provide a first impression regarding the performance of the different markets before and during the crisis. In the pre-crisis period, the local markets appear to behave relatively independent from Thailand. Whereas the UK, Australian, and Hong Kong markets increase in value over the first half of 1997 and Malaysia remains relatively stable, the Thai market experiences a drop in value from an index level of about 750 to just over 450 by the end of June. During the two crisis subperiods, however, there seems to be a more common trend across countries. In the first phase of the crisis, only UK and Australian markets remain stable whereas Malaysia and Hong Kong markets loose value. In the second phase of the crisis, all four markets experience a decline in value -alas to differing degrees. Whether this stock market behavior constitutes contagion will be investigated in more detail in the next section.
IV. Empirical results
The first step towards an analytical investigation into the performance of the different markets during the Asian crisis is presented in Tables III and IV . By reporting average daily returns and standard deviations we can illustrate the extent to which markets -via contagion or interdependences -were affected by the crisis. By reporting these statistics for Thai closing prices in Panel A as well as for Thailand's matched prices in Panel B, we are able to reveal the size of the error introduced into the contagion analysis by using only synchronized returns.
Based on average daily return of Panel A in Table III for the Thailand crisis phase, it appears that about a third the markets (5 of 15) experienced some stock market decline in the pre-crisis period. During the crisis period, however, all markets with the exception of China suffered losses with the highest daily average losses of -1.7% for Indonesia followed by the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia with just below -1%.
Looking now at the volatility introduced into the markets by the crisis shows that in all countries except China and Korea, standard deviations increased. Panel A of Table IV provides the same type of information for the Hong Kong phase of the crisis. Here, due to the fact that the pre-crisis period contains the Thai crisis phase a slightly larger number of markets (7 of 15) experienced some decline even before the crisis. In contrast, losses during this crisis phase are somewhat lower with the largest average daily losses occurring with -1.2% in Hong Kong and ranging from -0.8% to -0.7% in Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. Volatility increases were more pronounced during the Hong Kong phase of the crisis as standard deviations more than doubled in most countries and increased more than five-fold in Hong Kong.
Comparing now the Thai return and volatility based on closing prices reported in
Panel A (synchronized data) to the matched intra-day prices reported in Panel B
(synchronous data), reveals how and when closing prices can be misleading. For average daily returns in either pre-crisis period, the differences between synchronized and synchronous data are rather small due to the small size of the returns. In the crisis period when -as discussed above -prices are more volatile, the differences between synchronized and synchronous data become more pronounced. During the Thailand crisis, the largest difference of 0.00034 can be found for Thai returns matched to Philippines and Taiwan, followed closely by Australia, Japan, and Korea (0.00031). Note that markets with the largest time difference between synchronized and synchronous returns do not necessarily show the largest differences in Thai returns as European countries show only a difference of 0.00002. Whereas in the pre-crisis periods all synchronous standard deviations are higher than the synchronized standard deviation, in the crisis period this is true for 10 of 14 cases. For the Hong Kong phase of the crisis, the size difference between synchronized and synchronous returns are similar with the largest differences amounting to 0.00037 for China and Hong Kong and only small differences occurring for Europe. In contrast, the volatility comparison leads to a clearly different picture for this phase of the crisis. Here, for standard deviations in both the pre-crisis and crisis period, differences between synchronized and synchronous data can be large as in the case of Thai returns matched to Australia, Japan, or Korea in the pre-crisis period or China, Hong Kong and Indonesia in the crisis period. Whereas in the pre-crisis periods 8 of the 11 synchronous standard deviations are higher than the synchronized standard deviation, in the crisis period this is true for only 2 cases. Overall, the errors introduced by synchronized data are clearly present, however, no clear patterns with respect to size or sign of the misestimation can be found. Synchronized data does not uniformly over or underestimate results, nor is there a link between the time difference of closing prices and the size or sign of the error. Thus, using synchronized data for contagion analysis will lead to unpredictably incorrect results and conclusions regarding contagion or interdependence drawn from such data will be highly misleading.
[Insert Tables III and IV about During the crisis period, however, the picture is less uniform. Now, for only 6 out of 14 countries, synchronized correlations underestimate. For both, synchronized as well as synchronous data, correlations in the crisis period are higher than correlations in the precrisis period. As synchronous correlation tend on average to be higher in the pre-crisis period but lower in the crisis period when compared to synchronized data, it will be more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of interdependency. The Fisher statistics correctly reflects this implication. For the synchronized returns of Panel A, 9 cases of contagion and 5 cases of interdependency could be identified. When using synchronous returns instead, the result changes in 5 cases in the expected direction: For France, UK, Hong
Kong, Japan, and Korea the null hypothesis of interdependency can no longer be rejected.
Note that of the 5 changes, 4 occur in markets with large closing time differences of 4 hours or more.
For the second phase of the Asian crisis, the Hong Kong crisis, synchronized data underestimate correlations in the same 11 of 14 countries. Now the average underestimation amounts to 56% as reported in Table VI . For the crisis period, a different picture emerges in Table VI as compared to Table V . It appears that for the Hong Kong crisis, synchronized data underestimate also for a large number of countries (10 of 14) in the crisis period correlations. The average underestimation is with 62% even larger in the crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. For synchronized data, the Fisher tests now indicate contagion for 6 countries and interdependency for the remaining 8 countries.
When using the correctly specified synchronized data, however, a different conclusion can be drawn for 6 of the 14 countries: For all European countries, the null hypothesis of interdependency can now be rejected, whereas for Malaysia and the Philippine it cannot be rejected. As before, all changes occur in markets with large closing time differences of analysis.
[Insert Tables V and VI about here] Overall, our findings suggest that there is weak evidence of a significant change in the transmission mechanisms from Thailand to any of the other country in our sample. Our results for this phase of the crisis thus imply that most financial shocks are transmitted through non-crisis-contingent channels. The evidence that large cross-market linkages after a shock are merely a continuation of strong transmission mechanisms that already existed in more stable periods, however, contradicts the findings of contagion from the Hong Kong stock market to most of the other stock markets in our sample. This is in contrast with the findings of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and suggests that most shocks are transmitted through crisis-contingent theories, such as those based on multiple equilibria, endogenous liquidity shocks, and political contagion.
V. Conclusions
This paper has presented a framework based on correlation analysis to test for the For each country in our sample, column 2 and 3 report the unconditional (ρ l u ) and conditional (ρ h C ) correlation coefficients of that country's stock market index with the Thailand index, respectively. Column 4 reports the Fisher test statistic applied to differentiate between contagion and interdependency. In column 5 a C is reported when this tests indicates contagion and an I is reported when this test indicates interdependency. Confidences levels are indicated with * for the 5% confidence level and ** for the 1% confidence level. To match Forbes and Rigobon's sample periods, the pre-crisis period ranges from 1/4/1996 to 10/16/1997 and the crisis period ranges from 10/17/1997 to 11/16/1997.
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